Hawk-Dove Invasion Stability
Compare a rare invader with a resident population and discover when aggression stabilizes at a mixture rather than a pure strategy.
Free theory articleCompare a rare invader with a resident population and discover when aggression stabilizes at a mixture rather than a pure strategy.
Concept & interpretation
The Hawk-Dove game is a foundational model in evolutionary game theory used to study the evolution of aggressive behavior. It asks whether a rare mutant or invader can successfully integrate into a resident population, and determines what proportion of strategies is stable against all such invasions.
Experiment
Use the interactive Hawk-Dove Invasion Stability model below to compare fitness and advantages for different combinations of Resource value (V) and Injury cost (C).
- Start by setting Resource value to 1 and Injury cost to 2.
- Set the Resident hawk fraction to 0.5 and the Invader hawk fraction to 1.
- Observe that the Rare invader advantage becomes exactly 0. At this point, the first-order condition is zero. We must inspect the second ESS condition via Second ESS comparison to see if the mutant can drift to take over.
- Adjust the Resident hawk fraction back and forth to see how the rare invader advantage changes on the plotted curve. When V < C, the system stabilizes at a mixture of V/C.